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Abstract
In this paper we consider the problem of regulating an open access essential facility. A
vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market
under the roof of a regulatory mechanism. There is a potential entrant in the downstream
market. Both competitors use the same essential input to provide the final services to the
consumers. The regulator designs a mechanism that guarantees financing of the essential
input and adequate competition in the downstream market. We consider a regulatory mech-
anism that grants non-discriminatory access of the essential facility to a competitor. We
show that this mechanism is welfare improving but it generates inefficient entry. That is a
more efficient competitor may stay out of the market or a less efficient competitor may enter
the market.
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1 Introduction
There is an increasing worldwide trend to liberalize markets and introduce competition for ser-
vices that were previously operated by a monopolist. Markets like electricity, railways, telecom-
munication services, gas and water supply are now (or will be in the near future) open to
competition. A common feature of these markets is the presence of an ”essential facility” (or
input). The term essential facility is used to describe a facility or infrastructure which is essential
for reaching customers and/or enabling competitors to carry on their business and it is a facility
that cannot be cheaply duplicated. In this scenario, all competitors, contemplating entry in this
market, will have to use the same essential facility (as input) to provide these services. Hence
regulating the access of essential facility is an important issue.
Allowing for competition reduces the need for regulation if, due to technical changes, the
entrant or entrants can bypass the infrastructure of the monopolist. For example, it is now
possible to provide telecommunication services with wireless or cable TV networks and these
companies can compete with wire line networks on the telecommunication services market.
However, when this sort of bypass is not possible, that is, when there is a monopoly bottleneck in
the production chain due to the presence of the essential facility, competition and regulation are
complements rather than substitutes.1 Long-distance electricity transmission, high-speed rail-
tracks, local wire line telecommunication, water supply network are still considered as natural
monopolies. In these markets, allowing the access of essential facility (the bottleneck input) of
the incumbent firm to competitors helps to achieve a sufficient level of competition for the final
services. Moreover, financing the infrastructure is also an important concern for the regulator.
Therefore, there is a two dimensional conflict between granting generous access that reduces
downstream profits and the possibility of recovering the cost of the essential input. Hence, the
downstream market structure is a crucial part of the regulatory environment in a market with
essential facility. In this paper, we deal simultaneously with this two dimensional conflict and
in particular, we consider an endogenous market structure on the downstream market.
In the theory of access pricing proposed by Laffont and Tirole (1994), the market structure
is assumed to be exogenously given.2 In Laffont and Tirole (1994), the access charges, designed
by the regulator, aim at maximizing the total consumer surplus taking the number and the type
of competitors as given. Our approach is different since in our problem the regulator specifies
the access charges, to be paid by the potential entrant, without knowing the entrant’s cost
1World Bank (2002), World Development Report, chapter 8.
2So does the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) approach of Baumol et al. (1982) and Armstrong
(2001).
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conditions. Therefore, in our problem, entry takes place after the regulator has specified the
access charges. Auriol and Laffont (1993) consider the problem of firms with unknown cost
competing ex-ante for a market. In their problem, the market structure, ex-post, is part of the
regulatory mechanism and the regulator can allow the firms to operate as a duopoly in order to
reduce their information rent. Hence, the mechanism in Auriol and Laffont (1993) completely
regulates the market.3 We depart from this framework and analyze the situation in which it is
not possible for the regulator to regulate the activities of the potential entrant. Consequently,
there is no competition ex-ante for the market (the regulator cannot decides on the market
structure ex-ante) but ex-post, there is competition on the market.
In this paper, we assume that the regulator cannot extract the entrant’s cost information.
Given this lack of information, the regulator allows the entrant to use the essential facility on an
open access basis provided it pays the incumbent some specified price for using the same. Open
access means that any competitor that meets some pre-specified requirements (for example,
technical, safety or financial fitness requirements) can get access of the essential input on a
non-discriminatory basis.4 Granting a non-discriminatory access to the essential input is quite
common in practice. The European Commission specifies that access fees and access conditions
to the bottleneck input should be designed on a non-discriminatory basis (irrespective of the
entrant’s cost). For example, in the preamble to the rail directive 2002/14/EC, it is required
that: ”To ensure transparency and non-discriminatory access to rail infrastructure for all railway
undertakings, all the necessary information required to use the access rights are to be published
in a network statement” and ”The charging and capacity allocation schemes should permit
equal and non-discriminatory access for all undertakings”. Non-discriminatory access to the
railway tracks has been advocated by a large number of competition authorities, at least for
freight operators. For passenger services, access is limited to moderate competition (in the
UK for example).5 Similarly, in telecommunication, non-discriminatory access of wire lines
to competitors is the recommended policy. It is also quite common to have an asymmetric
regulatory regime between the incumbent and the entrants. The entrants are often free to pick
and choose the market and consumers while the incumbent is forced to serve all consumers.
Universal service obligations often apply only to the historical operator in the market. This
asymmetric treatment follows from the open-access regime: non-discrimination does not allow
the regulator to impose targeted regulatory constraints on the entrant beyond some minimal
3In Dana and Spier (1994), the government only regulates the market structure but not the firms’ output.
4In the European Union, railway undertakings need to apply for a license and a safety certificate delivered by
the Member States to provide rail services.
5Campos and Cantos (1999).
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quality standard common to all entrants. While the established monopolist is under the roof
of a more stringent regulatory regime, especially when the regulator finances, at least partially,
the incumbent’s infrastructure.
Our paper integrates these two features: open and non-discriminatory access to the essential
input and different regulatory regime for the incumbent and the competitor. We consider the
problem of regulating both the service provision of an incumbent firm which is the owner of an
essential input (for example, railway tracks) and the access charges to be paid by the competitors
for using the incumbent’s input. Cost recovering of the bottleneck input is a major concern in this
problem. This paper describes the regulatory mechanism when the essential input is operated
on a non-discriminatory open access basis. It also raises the question of efficient entry. Entry
is not efficient when either a more efficient competitor stays out of the market or a less efficient
competitor enters the market.
The regulatory mechanism, under known marginal cost of the incumbent, prescribes (1)
above marginal cost pricing if entry does not occur but a price below the incumbent’s marginal
cost if entry does occur, (2) a positive lump-sum entry fee to be paid by the entrant to finance the
incumbent’s network cost, (3) a per-unit subsidy to be paid by the incumbent to the entrant to
reduce the post entry marginal cost of the entrant to achieve near competitive output, (4) a public
subsidy to finance the infrastructure cost uncovered by access charges, (5) competition reduces
the share of public transfer in infrastructure financing and (6) absence of cross subsidization
of the incumbent’s network costs by the incumbent’s profit on the downstream market. Under
this regulatory regime, a potential entrant, more efficient than the regulated incumbent, may
stay out of the market. The regulator imposes high access charges and thereby allows less
entry to reduce the financial needs of the infrastructure owner. Therefore, entry of a more
efficient competitor does not necessarily occur since there is a conflict between competition
and infrastructure financing. If the regulator is unaware of the incumbent’s cost of producing
downstream services, she designs a mechanism which leaves an information rent to the more
efficient incumbent firm. Given that these rents are socially costly, the regulator reduces these
rents by allowing more entry on the downstream market. A more severe competitive pressure
reduces the information rents paid to the incumbent. Hence, under asymmetric information,
the regulator partially substitutes incumbent’s production by entrant’s production. However,
inefficient entry occurs in both directions. An entrant less cost efficient than the incumbent can
enter the downstream market or an entrant more efficient cannot operate on the market.
One can compare the results of our paper with other papers dealing with the problem of reg-
ulation with an endogenous market structure. Caillaud and Tirole (2003) consider the problem
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of infrastructure financing under asymmetric information. Like in our model, an open access
policy raises welfare but since competition reduces profit, the project could be non-viable if it
is operated on an open access basis. However, in their model, a monopoly franchise on the
downstream market is granted to the incumbent firm in situations where competition may be
highly valuable, for example, when the market has a high future profitability. It is only for less
favorable market conditions that the downstream market is open to competition. This pattern
results from the common value environment of the model. Both social welfare and profit in-
crease with the market profitability and it is not possible for the regulator to extract the private
information of the incumbent when the market profitability is high unless it grants a monopoly
franchise. The regulator and the incumbent firm are in a situation of non-responsiveness where
efficiency and incentives conflict.6 Caillaud (1990) considers the problem of regulating an incum-
bent firm facing the threat of entry on the downstream market. Like in our setting, unregulated
competitors can enter the downstream market after the regulator had specified the regulatory
mechanism. But, in Caillaud (1990) competitors bypass the essential input of the incumbent
and supplies the service on the downstream market using an alternate technology. The regulator
then has fewer instruments to influence the entry decision and she cannot credibly deter entry
by setting large access charges. Caillaud’s model applies, for example, to competition between a
regulated train operator and competitive coach services. In his framework, there is a competitive
fringe of entrants on the market and the regulator shuts down the incumbent if the competitors
are more efficient than the incumbent. This is not possible in our framework, since shut down
implies that the market would be then left to an unregulated monopolist. In a market where
competitors use the incumbent’s essential facility, it is not possible to have a competitive fringe
of entrants because perfect competition drives profits to zero. Hence, either the access charges
should be set to zero to allow for entry or, if the regulator wants the entrants to partially finance
the infrastructure, there is no entry.
2 The main problem
A regulated incumbent firm provides services to the final consumers. To provide the services, the
firm uses an essential facility (network) as input. There is a potential entrant on the downstream
market. To operate on the downstream market, both the incumbent and the entrant use the
same essential input. The entrant can use the incumbent’s essential input provided that it
6Guesnerie and Laffont (1984).
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pays the incumbent an appropriate access charge.7 We suppose that the incumbent firm is
vertically integrated and owns the network. The incumbent receives public subsidies to finance
the network. Given that the public authority finances (at least partially) the essential input
of the incumbent, it regulates the incumbent on the downstream market. In particular, the
regulator (or public authority) specifies the amount of services that the incumbent should supply
to the consumers. The regulator also specifies the amount of access charge that the incumbent
should receive from the entrant if it decides to enter the downstream market. The access charge,
in our problem is a two-part tariff that is, it consists of a fixed entry fee and a per-unit fee.
Given the open access nature of the essential facility, an entrant who pays the access charge to
the incumbent, can operate on the downstream market without being further regulated. The
regulatory mechanism is observable and hence the potential entrant decides on whether or not
to enter the downstream market after observing the decision imposed on the incumbent by the
regulator. Figure 1 depicts the timing of the events.
- time
Firms learn
their costs privately.
The regulator designs
the regulatory mechanism.
The potential entrant
decides on entry
Active firms compete
on the downstream market.
Figure 1: The timing of the events
The downstream market demand function is P (Q) = a − bQ where a > 0, b > 0, Q is the
quantity demanded and P (Q) is the market clearing price corresponding to Q. The vertically
integrated incumbent builds up the essential facility and provides services to the final consumers.
The (known) fixed cost of building up the infrastructure is c > 0. There is no cost of using the
infrastructure.8 The incumbent can supply services at a constant marginal cost θ ∈ [θ, θ]. The
total cost of the integrated firm (or incumbent), when it supplies qi units, is C(qi, θ) = θqi + c.
We will consider the possibility of both known and unknown cost. When the cost is unknown,
we need the following assumptions for our analysis.
1. The marginal cost has a continuous and almost everywhere differentiable density f(.) and
f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ],
7The European Union adopted this type of regime for gas, electricity and rail markets: the network owner
should provide access to competitors on a non-discriminatory basis.
8This is for simplicity only. If there is a marginal cost ψ of operating on the network, the per-unit access
charge paid by the entrant and the incumbent’s marginal cost should both be increased by ψ and the analysis is
identical.
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2. The distribution satisfies the hazard rate condition: F (θ)f(θ) is increasing in θ.
The potential entrant can produce an amount qe at a marginal cost of φ ∈ [θ, θ]. Throughout
the paper we assume that the marginal cost of the entrant is unknown and that it follows a
uniform distribution, that is g(φ) = 1∆ for all φ ∈ [θ, θ] where ∆ ≡ θ − θ. We also assume that
the marginal cost of the entrant is independent of the marginal cost of the incumbent. When
correlation between the incumbent’s and the entrant’s cost is positive, the regulatory problem
is in general non concave, hence untractable (see Caillaud (1990)). With independence, the
problem may be non concave too but a solution is possible. The entrant observes the incumbent’s
regulatory regime before his entry decision. If the potential entrant decides to enter the market,
it has to compensate the incumbent adequately. We consider a two part access charge-a fixed
fee A and a per-unit fee α. In our problem, an entrant, that supplies qe > 0 units of the facility,
pays A+ αqe to the incumbent. The amounts of A and α are specified by the regulator.
The regulator maximizes the consumer surplus net of transfer to the incumbent, that is,
W = S(Q)− P (Q)Q− t where S(Q) = ∫Q0 P (x)dx and t is the amount of transfer paid by the
regulator to the incumbent. In this context, the transfer t is meant to finance the infrastructure.
We assume that there exists a non-distortionary tax system and hence the shadow cost of public
fund is equal to zero. Hence, the regulator has four instruments at her disposal-the quantity of
the incumbent qi, the transfer t, the fixed fee A and the per-unit fee α.
There are two stages to our problem. In the first stage the regulator offers a regulatory
mechanism to the incumbent. The regulatory mechanism M = 〈qi(.), A(.), α(.), t(.)〉 specifies a
quantity-access charge-transfer quadruple that depends on the marginal cost of the incumbent.
Here the quantity of the incumbent, fixed fee and per unit fee of the entrant and the transfer are
mappings from the interval of types to a subset of the real line. In particular, qi : [θ, θ]→ R+,
A : [θ, θ] → R, α : [θ, θ] → R and t : [θ, θ] → R. We restrict attention to continuous and
differentiable mechanisms. Given the regulatory mechanism, in stage 2, the potential entrant
decides whether or not to enter the market. If it decides to enter, it pays the access charge to
the incumbent and decides what amount of service it will supply.
In our framework, the entrant observes the regulatory mechanism before it makes its entry
and quantity decisions. The entrant is a Stackelberg follower in the quantity game. The price is
then set to equate demand and supply. The Stackelberg structure of the quantity game reflects
the dominant position of the incumbent in the downstream market. Competitive entry is not
possible in this framework since under perfect competition, the price is driven to marginal cost
and firms make zero profit. Hence the entrant cannot pay the access charges. Before analyzing
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our main problem, we first study the case of no entry under both complete and incomplete
information.
3 Downstream Monopoly
In this section we assume that the incumbent firm does not face the threat of entry, that is
the incumbent is a monopolist. The regulatory mechanism M˜(θ) = 〈qi(θ), t(θ)〉 then specifies a
quantity transfer pair only. If the regulator knows the true cost of the incumbent, the optimal
regulatory mechanism is obtained by maximizing W (θ) = S(qi(θ))−P (qi(θ))qi(θ)− t(θ) subject
to the participation constraint of the incumbent: Πi(θ) = (P (qi(θ))− θ)qi(θ)− c+ t(θ) ≥ 0.
PROPOSITION 3.1 Without the threat of entry, the optimal regulatory mechanism under
complete information is M˜ f˜ (θ) = 〈qf˜i (θ), tf˜ (θ)〉 for any given θ ∈ [θ, θ] where
1. qf˜i (θ) =
a−θ
b and
2. tf˜ (θ) = c
Observe that given the objective function of the regulator and the participation constraint
of the monopolist, it is optimal for the regulator to set the profit of the monopolist to zero.
Incorporating profit equals to zero in the objective function we get the optimal regulatory
quantity and hence the transfer. Under the optimal mechanism, the regulated downstream
monopolist is required to produce the quantities qf˜i (θ) such that the market clearing price
equals the firm’s marginal cost: P (qf˜i (θ)) = θ. Consumer surplus is then maximized but the
firm cannot cover its infrastructure cost with its receipts. Hence, the regulator fully finances the
infrastructure with transfer: tf˜ (θ) = c.
If the regulator is unaware of the true marginal cost of the monopolist, the regulator’s ob-
jective now is to design a direct mechanism that maximizes the expected welfare
∫ θ
θ W (θ)f(θ)dθ
subject to the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint of the monop-
olist.9 Using the Revelation Principle we restrict our attention to direct revelation mecha-
nism where the firm announces a type (or marginal cost) and based on this announcement
the mechanism M˜(.) = 〈qi(.), t(.)〉 specifies a type contingent quantity-transfer pair. Let
Πi(θ′; θ) = Πi(θ′) − (θ − θ′)qi(θ′). In other words, Πi(θ′; θ) is the profit of the incumbent
firm, under the mechanism M˜ s˜(.), if the true marginal cost is θ ∈ [θ, θ] and if the announce-
ment is θ′ ∈ [θ, θ]. Clearly, Πi(θ; θ) = Πi(θ), ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Given these definitions, incentive
9The problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown cost was first considered by Baron and Myerson (1982).
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compatibility constraint states that Πi(θ) ≥ Πi(θ; θ′), ∀(θ, θ′) ∈ [θ, θ]2 and, as stated earlier,
Πi(θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] is the participation constraint. It is well known in the literature that
the optimal mechanism M˜ s˜(.) = 〈qf˜i (.), tf˜ (.)〉 satisfies the incentive compatibility and the par-
ticipation constraint if and only if ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ], the optimal quantity qs˜i (θ) is non-increasing in
θ and Πi(θ) =
∫ θ
θ q
s˜
i (τ)dτ .
10 The objective of the regulator is to select that M˜(.) = 〈qi(.), t(.)〉
(from the class of direct revelation mechanisms) which maximizes Wˆ ≡ ∫ θ=θθ=θ W (θ)f(θ)dθ =∫ θ=θ
θ=θ [S(qi(θ))− P (qi(θ))qi(θ)− t(θ)] f(θ)dθ subject to (i) Πi(θ) ≥ Πi(θ; θ′), ∀(θ, θ′) ∈ [θ, θ]2 and
(ii) Πi(θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ].
Before providing the solution we define L(θ) = F (θ)f(θ) as the hazard function and z(θ) = θ+L(θ)
as the virtual type function. z(θ) is increasing in θ by assumption 2.
PROPOSITION 3.2 Without the threat of entry, the optimal regulatory mechanism under
incomplete information is M˜ s˜(.) = 〈qs˜i (.), ts˜(.)〉 where for any announced θ ∈ [θ, θ],
1. qs˜i (θ) = q
f˜
i (z(θ)) =
a−z(θ)
b and
2. ts˜(θ) = c− L(θ)qs˜i (θ) +
∫ θ
θ q
s˜
i (τ)dτ
The proof is fairly standard in the mechanism design literature and is hence eliminated.
Here the market clearing price equals the virtual marginal cost z(θ) instead of the true marginal
cost θ. Observe that the relevant constraint is not the participation constraint but the incentive
constraint (for all but the highest type). The firm truthfully reveals its marginal cost only if
it gets adequate information rent. To reduce this cost of truth-telling, the regulator optimally
distorts the quantity supplied by the firm and hence the price is above the marginal cost for all
but the lowest cost firm. Once the optimal amount of service is specified, the transfer of the
monopolist with type θ follows from Πi(θ) =
∫ θ
θ q
s˜
i (τ)dτ . Given the form of the optimal quantity,
z(θ) is increasing in θ is necessary to guarantee that the optimal quantity is decreasing in θ.
This in turn is a sufficient condition to guarantee that incentive compatibility and individual
rationality conditions are satisfied. Thus, the assumption on L(θ) guarantees a separating
optimal mechanism.
10The reason why optimal quantity is non-increasing follows directly by solving the inequality in the definition
of incentive compatibility for any pair of types. The reason for the necessity of Πi(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
qs˜i (τ)dτ is the following.
For incentive constraint to hold, it is necessary that ∂Πi(θ)
∂θ
= −qs˜i (θ) for almost all θ ∈ (θ, θ). Moreover, under
the optimal mechanism participation constraint implies that Πi(θ) = 0. These two conditions together imply that
Πi(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
qs˜i (τ)dτ for all θ ∈ [θ, θ].
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4 Downstream Competition
In this section, we describe the regulatory mechanism when there is the possibility of entry in
the downstream market. We consider two sub-cases, one where the cost of the incumbent in
known and one where it is unknown.
4.1 Known cost of the incumbent
In the presence of entry possibility, the regulatory mechanism M(θ) specifies a quadruple:
M(θ) = 〈qi(θ), A(θ), α(θ), t(θ)〉 for any given and commonly known marginal cost θ ∈ [θ, θ]
of the incumbent. The entry decision is taken after the regulator has designed the regulatory
mechanism. Therefore, even if the entrant is not regulated, the regulatory mechanism (except
the transfer received by the incumbent) affects the entry decision and the quantity supplied by
the entrant. For brevity of notation let us denote 〈qi(θ), A(θ), α(θ)〉 by V (θ). The entrant’s
maximization problem is to select qe(V (θ)) = maxqe Πe(qe, V (θ);φ) where Πe(qe, V (θ);φ) ≡
(P (qe+ qi(θ))−α(θ)− φ)qe−A(θ). Assuming entry takes place, the solution to this problem is
qe(V (θ)) =
a− α(θ)− φ
2b
− qi(θ)
2
(4.1)
The profit of an entrant, active in the downstream market, is:
Πe(qe(V (θ)), V (θ);φ) =
(a− α(θ)− φ− bqi(θ))2
4b
−A(θ) (4.2)
Clearly, the potential entrant will enter the downstream market if its profit is strictly positive.
Given the regulatory mechanism M(θ) = 〈qi(θ), A(θ), α(θ), t(θ)〉, it is obvious from (4.2) that
the potential entrant enters the downstream market if φ ∈ [θ,K(θ)) where K(θ) = P (qi(θ)) −
α(θ) − 2√bA(θ). It is also clear from (4.2) that the larger the gap between the no-entry price
P (qi(θ)) = a−bqi(θ) and the entrant’s marginal cost plus the per-unit fee φ+α(θ), the larger the
entrant’s profit. Hence, there is entry if the price marginal cost gap (including in the marginal
cost the entry fee α(θ)) is sufficiently large to cover the fixed entry cost A(θ). Therefore, the
profit of the entrant, with per unit cost φ ∈ [θ, θ], is
Πe(qe(V (θ)), V (θ);φ) =
 0 if φ ≥ K(θ)(P (Q(θ))− α(θ)− φ) qe(V (θ))−A(θ) if φ < K(θ)
where Q(θ) = qi(θ) + qe(V (θ)). The ex-post profit of the incumbent under the mechanism M(.)
with known marginal cost θ ∈ [θ, θ], is
Πi(M(θ); θ) =
 (P (qi(θ))− θ) qi(θ)− c+ t(θ) if φ ≥ K(θ)(P (Q(θ))− θ) qi(θ)− c+ t(θ) + α(θ)qe(V (θ)) +A(θ) if φ < K(θ)
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We now consider the mechanism design problem of the regulator. Consider any mechanism
M(.). Given that the marginal cost of the potential entrant is unknown and follows a uniform
distribution over the relevant marginal cost interval [θ, θ], the expected profit of the incumbent
in stage 1 is Πˆi(θ) = 1∆
∫ φ=θ
φ=θ Πi(M(θ); θ)dφ. Simplifying the expected profit of the incumbent
we get
Πˆi(θ) =
1
∆
 φ=K(θ)∫
φ=θ
{P (Q(θ))qi(θ) + α(θ)qe(V (θ)) +A(θ)} dφ+
φ=θ∫
φ=K(θ)
P (qi(θ))qi(θ)dφ
−c−θqi(θ)+ t(θ) (4.3)
The regulator’s objective is (I) to select a quadruple M(θ) = 〈qi(θ), A(θ), α(θ), t(θ)〉, for any
commonly known θ ∈ [θ, θ], that maximizesW (θ) = 1∆
∫ φ=θ
φ=θ {S(Q(θ))− P (Q(θ))Q(θ)− t(θ)} dφ
subject to the participation constraint of the incumbent (that is, subject to Πˆi(θ) ≥ 0).
PROPOSITION 4.3 The solution to the regulator’s optimization problem (I) is the following:
for any known θ ∈ [θ, θ], the optimal mechanism is Mf (θ) = 〈qfi (θ), Af (θ), αf (θ), tf (θ)〉 where
1. qfi (θ) =
a−H(θ)
b
2. αf (θ) = − 511(H(θ)− θ) < 0
3. Af (θ) = 36(H(θ)−θ)
2
121b and
4. tf (θ) = c− 1∆
φ=K(θ)∫
φ=θ
{Af (θ) + αf (θ)qe(V f (θ))}dφ = c− 4(H(θ)−θ)
3
113b∆
≤ c
H(θ) is a strictly increasing and strictly convex function in θ with H(θ) = θ and H(θ) > θ for
all θ ∈ (θ, θ].
PROOF: See Appendix.
Compared to downstream monopoly where, under symmetric information, the market clears
at marginal cost, here, the market price is above the incumbent’s marginal cost if entry does
not occur that is P (qfi (θ)) = H(θ) > θ for all θ ∈ (θ, θ]. This means that the incumbent
produces less compared to the regulated monopoly regime. However, if entry takes place,
the market price falls below the incumbent’s marginal cost. Interestingly, the expected price
is such that the incumbent realizes a zero profit from its downstream operations, that is
Pˆ f (θ) ≡ 1∆
[∫ φ=Kf (θ)
φ=θ P (qe(V
f (θ)) + qfi (θ))dφ+
∫ φ=θ
φ=Kf (θ)
P (qfi (θ))dφ
]
= θ for all θ ∈ [θ, θ].
Even though the expected price (the expected consumer surplus) is identical to the price (the
consumer surplus) under the regulated monopoly regime, competition increases welfare because
the financial contribution of the regulator is lower (tf (θ) < c = tf˜ (θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ]).
The infrastructure is financed by (i) the net payment of the entrant, (ii) the public transfer
of the regulator. If the potential entrant decides to enter, it has to pay a lump-sum access charge
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to the incumbent and it receives a per-unit subsidy from the incumbent. The reason for per-unit
subsidy is to reduce the market power of the entrant. In the absence of per-unit subsidy, the
entrant, being unregulated, enjoys market power and supplies less than the competitive output.
In other words, in the absence of per-unit subsidy, the entrant will supply an output less than
that under perfect competition (since Stackelberg follower output is lower than the competitive
output). By setting αf (θ) < 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ], the regulator artificially reduces the entrant’s
marginal cost and thereby partially offsets the negative effect of the entrant’s market power.11
It is worth noting that, if the downstream market was more competitive, that is, if there were
a larger number of potential entrants, then the entrants would have had less market power and
hence the regulator will subsidize them less. Being distortionary, the per-unit access charge is
used only to cancel partially the entrant’s market power. Conversely, the non-distortionary fixed
fee is used by the regulator to transfer profit from the unregulated competitor to the incumbent
since the incumbent owns the essential facility that needs financing.
In our problem, even if the subsidy reduces the market power of the entrant, in the optimal
mechanism, there is a positive net transfer from the entrant to the incumbent. This is captured
by 1∆
∫ φ=K(θ)
φ=θ {Af (θ)+αf (θ)qe(V f (θ))}dφ = 4(H(θ)−θ)
3
113b∆
> 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ]. The fixed part of the
access charge aims to partially finance the infrastructure and to deter entry of high marginal cost
potential entrants. Entry needs to be restricted optimally because the price is above marginal
cost under the optimal mechanism if the incumbent stays as a monopolist. This price mark up
attracts inefficient entrants in the downstream market. To exclude these potential inefficient
entrants, the regulator fixes a high access charge Af (θ). Finally, when will entry take place?
The next proposition answers this question.
PROPOSITION 4.4 Under Mf (θ) = 〈qfi (θ), Af (θ), αf (θ), tf (θ)〉, entry is inefficient. Entry
takes place for all φ ∈ [θ,Kf (θ)) where θ < Kf (θ) < θ, ∀θ ∈ (θ, θ] and Kf (θ) = θ.
PROOF: Under the optimal mechanism Mf (θ) = 〈qfi (θ), Af (θ), αf (θ), tf (θ)〉, the entry limit
is Kf (θ) = 411H(θ) +
7
11θ. Using H(θ), we get K
f (θ) = θ + 11∆14 − 114
√
121∆2 − 112∆(θ − θ).
From Kf (θ), it follows that Kf (θ) = θ and Kf (θ) = 47θ +
3
7θ < θ. To show that K
f (θ) < θ for
all θ ∈ (θ, θ), we consider θ−Kf (θ) = (θ−θ)− 11∆14 + 114
√
121∆2 − 112∆(θ − θ). We then apply
proof by contradiction to show that θ −Kf (θ) > 0. Finally, θ < Kf (θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ) follows
from the fact that Kf (θ) = θ and from the fact that ∂K
f (θ)
∂θ > 0 over the relevant range.
11This result is standard in the access pricing literature. See Laffont and Tirole (2000), chapter 2. Note that
with a positive marginal cost ψ of operating on the network, the optimal per-unit access charge is ψ+αf (θ) < ψ.
In this case, the access charge is not necessarily negative but entry is subsidized as the entrant pays less than the
marginal cost of operating the service.
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To preserve financing of the essential facility, the regulator bans those entrants that are more
efficient than the operating incumbent but for which the cost advantage is not that high (that
is, entrants whose marginal cost φ ∈ (Kf (θ), θ]). By limiting entry, the regulator raises the
incumbent’s revenue. However, all type of incumbent firms, but the most efficient one, face a
positive probability of entry since θ < Kf (θ), ∀θ ∈ (θ, θ]. This means that, except for the most
efficient incumbent, the regulator never grants a monopoly franchise to the incumbent firm.
When the infrastructure cost is partially financed by public transfers, it is always efficient to
allow for the entry of a more efficient competitor, provided that the efficiency advantage of the
competitor is sufficiently large. This part of the result is in sharp contrast to the result in Caillaud
and Tirole (2003). In Caillaud and Tirole (2003), the regulator bans entry of competitors on
market with high future profitability.
4.2 Unknown cost of the incumbent
In this sub-section we assume that marginal cost of the incumbent is private information. Hence,
the regulator is unaware of the marginal cost of both the incumbent and the entrant. Therefore,
we have a mechanism design problem of the regulator under incomplete information.
The objective of the regulator now is (II) to select M = 〈qi(θ), A(θ), α(θ), t(θ)〉, that maxi-
mizes Wˆ ≡ ∫ θ=θθ=θ W (θ)dθ = ∫ θ=θθ=θ [ 1∆ ∫ φ=θφ=θ {S(Q(θ))− P (Q(θ))Q(θ)− t(θ)} dφ] dθ subject to (i)
the participation constraint Πˆi(θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] and (ii) the incentive compatible constraint:
Πˆi(θ) ≥ Πˆi(θ; θ′), ∀(θ, θ′) ∈ [θ, θ]2 where Πˆi(θ; θ′) = Πˆi(θ′)− (θ − θ′)qi(θ′). Applying arguments
similar to the no-entry case under asymmetric information we get that the optimal mechanism
M satisfies the incentive compatibility and the participation constraint if and only if ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ],
the optimal quantity qi(θ) is non-increasing in θ and Πˆi(θ) =
∫ θ
θ qi(τ)dτ .
The optimization problem (II) may turn out to be non concave for certain density function
f(.) of marginal cost of the incumbent. For example, if f(.) is uniform, the optimization problem
is not concave. When (II) is not concave, a characterization of the solution is possible by
bunching types appropriately. The problem may be non concave because the market structure
is endogenous. Though the welfare function is a regular quadratic function but since qi(θ)
determines the entry condition, the expected surplus is a cubical equation.12
PROPOSITION 4.5 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the solution to the regulator’s optimiza-
tion problem (II) is the following: for each θ ∈ [θ, θ], the optimal mechanism is M s(θ) =
12Caillaud (1990) demonstrates that when a competitive fringe can compete with a regulated monopolist, in his
case without using the monopolist’s essential facility, the problem may not satisfied concavity, even if the virtual
type function z(θ) ≡ θ + L(θ) is increasing in θ.
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〈qsi (θ), As(θ), αs(θ), ts(θ)〉, where
1. the optimal type contingent quantity of the incumbent is
qsi (θ) =
 q
f (z(θ)) ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ˜]
qf (z(θ˜)) ∀θ ∈ (θ˜, θ]
2. the optimal incumbent type contingent fixed access charge for the potential entrant is
Asi (θ) =
 A
f (z(θ)) ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ˜]
Af (z(θ˜)) ∀θ ∈ (θ˜, θ]
3. the optimal incumbent type contingent per unit access charge for the potential entrant is
αsi (θ) =
 α
f (z(θ)) ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ˜]
αf (z(θ˜)) ∀θ ∈ (θ˜, θ]
4. the optimal type contingent transfer to the incumbent is
ts(θ) =
 t
f (z(θ))− L(θ)qsi (θ) +
∫ θ
θ q
s
i (τ)dτ ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ˜]
ts(θ˜) ∀θ ∈ (θ˜, θ]
and
5. the full separability (that is θ˜ = θ) or partial separability of optimal output of the incum-
bent is determined by
θ˜ =
 θ if z(θ) ≤ θ +
9∆
112
z−1
(
θ + 9∆112
)
otherwise
PROOF: See Appendix.
The mechanism under asymmetric information is similar to the complete information frame-
work, modulo the facts that the regulator uses the virtual marginal cost z(θ) for the incumbent
rather than its true cost θ and that there could be bunching of the less efficient types of incum-
bent.
Like in Caillaud (1990), the regulator substitutes the production of the incumbent by the
production of the entrant, hence, the rents paid to the incumbent are lower while the expected
price remains identical (Pˆ s(θ) = z(θ) for all θ ≤ θ˜). Thus, competition is welfare enhancing.
However, the incumbent always produces while in Caillaud (1990), the incumbent is shut down
when its virtual marginal cost is larger than the expected cost of the entrant. The reason is that
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incumbent’s presence enhances competition on the downstream market which is not necessary
in Caillaud’s framework due to the presence of a competitive fringe of entrants.
When concavity is not satisfied, that is for some f(θ) and θ > θ˜, the mechanism is a third best
one where there is bunching. Bunching appears when there is a lot of entry i.e. for the highest
values of θ. To overcome the existence problem and to preserve competition, the regulator sets
a minimal quantity for the higher types.
Without bunching, the expected price Pˆ s(θ) is equal to the virtual marginal cost z(θ).
Hence, for each θ, the consumer surplus is in average identical to the regulated monopoly regime
under asymmetric information. Competition is welfare improving because the contribution of
the regulator to the infrastructure cost is lower: ts(θ) < ts˜(θ). Like in the known cost case,
the positive contribution of the entrant to the infrastructure cost implies a reduction of the
transfer. In addition, given that the incumbent produces less when it faces the threat of entry,
the information rent is also lower, hence another reason to reduce the transfer. In the bunching
region, Pˆ s(θ) = z(θ˜) < z(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ˜, θ]. Consumer surplus in average increase compared to
the monopoly regime, and competition is also welfare improving, even if transfer may increase.
In this mechanism, entry occurs if φ ≤ Ks(θ) = Kf (z(θ)). Again, we raise the question of
efficient entry and we compare the entry levels under complete and incomplete information.
PROPOSITION 4.6 Under M s(θ) = 〈qsi (θ), As(θ), αs(θ), ts(θ)〉, the following can be said
about the entry limit Ks(θ).
1. If θ˜ = θ, then Ks(θ) = θ, Ks(θ) < θ, Ks(θ) is strictly increasing in θ ∈ (θ, θ) and
Kf (θ) < Ks(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ].
2. If θ˜ < θ, then Ks(θ) = θ, Ks(θ˜) < θ, Ks(θ) is strictly increasing in θ ∈ (θ, θ˜), Ks(θ) =
Ks(θ˜) for all θ ∈ [θ˜, θ] and Kf (θ) < Ks(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ].
PROOF: If θ˜ = θ, then Ks(θ) = Kf (z(θ)) = θ. Observe that Ks(θ) = 1114θ +
3
14θ −
1
14
√
9∆2 − 112∆L(θ) < θ since
√
9∆2 − 112∆L(θ) is a positive real number. Moreover, since
Ks(θ) = Kf (z(θ)) and Kf (z(θ)) and z(θ) are increasing in z(θ) and θ respectively, it follows
that Ks(θ) is increasing in θ ∈ (θ, θ).13 Finally, Ks(θ) −Kf (θ) = 411(H(z(θ)) −H(θ)) > 0 for
all θ ∈ (θ, θ].
If θ˜ < θ, then Ks(θ) = θ. Given H(z(θ˜)) = 121∆56 , we get K
s(θ˜) = 1114θ+
3
14θ. Hence, K
s(θ˜) <
θ. Moreover, for all θ ∈ (θ, θ˜), Ks(θ) = Kf (z(θ)) and Kf (z(θ)) and z(θ) are increasing in z(θ)
13Note that it is not obvious whether Ks(θ) is increasing at a decreasing or an increasing rate.
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and θ respectively. Therefore, Ks(θ) is increasing in θ ∈ (θ, θ˜). With bunching, qsi (θ) = qsi (θ˜)
for all θ ∈ [θ˜, θ]. This means that Ks(θ) = 411H(z(θ˜)) + θ = Ks(θ˜) for all θ ∈ [θ˜, θ]. To prove
the last part of the Proposition, observe first that (a) Ks(θ)−Kf (θ) = 411(H(z(θ))−H(θ)) > 0
for all θ ∈ (θ, θ˜]. Observe next that (b) for all θ ∈ (θ˜, θ), Ks(θ) = Ks(θ˜) and Kf (θ) is increasing
at an increasing rate. Lastly, observe that (c) Kf (θ)(= 47θ +
3
7θ) < K
s(θ˜)(= 1114θ +
3
14θ). From
observations (a), (b) and (c) it follows that Kf (θ) < Ks(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ].
What follows from Proposition 4.6 is that Kf (θ) < Ks(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ], that is, there
is more entry under M s(θ) in comparison to Mf (θ). The reason is that the regulator allows
entry by considering the gap between the incumbent’s virtual marginal cost and the entrant’s
true marginal cost while under complete information, the regulator allows entry by considering
the gap between the incumbent’s true (and not virtual) marginal cost and the entrant’s true
marginal cost. Since the virtual marginal cost of the incumbent is larger than its true marginal
cost, there is more entry under asymmetric information. There is more entry under incomplete
information due to the asymmetric regulatory treatment between the incumbent and the entrant.
For efficiency reasons, the regulator extracts the private information of the incumbent through
a fully or partially separating regulatory mechanism. But due to asymmetric information the
incumbent receives information rent. While given the open-access nature of the infrastructure,
the entrant’s regulatory regime (the entry conditions) does not depend on its private informa-
tion. Hence, the regulator pays information rents only to the incumbent which imply that the
incumbent’s marginal cost raises from θ to z(θ). Hence, the regulator allows more entry under
asymmetric information simply because production of the incumbent is relatively more costly
than that of the entrant.14
UnderM s(θ) two types of inefficient entry is possible. They are: (1) not allowing a potential
entrant, more efficient than the incumbent, to operate on the downstream market and (2)
allowing a potential entrant, less efficient than the incumbent, to operate on the downstream
market. The first type of inefficiency (that is, not allowing a potential entrant, more efficient than
the incumbent, to operate on the downstream market) follows from Proposition 4.6. Note that
Ks(θ) = θ andKs(θ) < θ (Ks(θ˜) < θ) under a fully (partially) separating mechanism guarantees
that there are intervals in the domain of the continuously differentiable Ks(θ) function such
that Ks(θ) < θ. However, the other type of inefficiency (that is, allowing a potential entrant,
less efficient than the incumbent, to operate on the downstream market) does not follow from
Proposition 4.6. While the first type of inefficiency is always true. The second type of inefficiency
depends on distribution of the marginal cost of the incumbent. It is easy to see that if, for
14McAfee and McMillan (1987) have a similar result in the context of auctions.
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example, f(.) follows uniform distribution, that is, if f(θ) = g(θ) = 1∆ for all θ ∈ [θ, θ], then
the second type of inefficiency is also possible. With uniform distribution there will be pooling
and in particular the cut-off point is θ˜ = 121224θ +
103
224θ. Given that K
s(θ˜) = 1114θ +
3
14θ, it follows
that Ks(θ˜) − θ˜ = 55224∆ > 0. Hence, if the marginal cost of the incumbent follows uniform
distribution, then Ks(θ˜) > θ˜ which implies that there are stretches of the Ks(θ) function where
the second type of inefficiency arises that is there are intervals in the domain of Ks(θ) where
Ks(θ) > θ. Figure 2 illustrates the entry levels for the uniform distribution.
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Figure 2: The entry levels under complete and incomplete information for f(θ) = 1∆ .
5 Conclusions
The main conclusion of this paper is that granting non-discriminatory access of the essential facil-
ity to a competitor is welfare improving but it generates inefficient entry. Welfare improvement is
due to (1) the contribution of the entrant to infrastructure financing and (2) lower information
rent paid to the incumbent when the regulator is unaware of the incumbent’s marginal cost.
Competition leads to a larger consumer surplus only when there is bunching of less efficient
incumbents. In the other cases, the expected price is the same as in the regulated monopoly
regime and competition allows the regulator to reduce her transfer. As a result, we have a rise
in social welfare.
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The regulatory mechanism takes care of the conflict between efficient market structure and
infrastructure financing. Under known cost of the incumbent, entry ban of more efficient com-
petitor aims to finance the infrastructure. By allowing only the entry of competitor with a
sufficiently large cost advantage, the regulator can extract a larger contribution towards the
cost of the essential input. Under unknown cost, the regulator allows the entry of competitor
with a sufficiently large cost advantage over the virtual marginal cost. Since the virtual marginal
cost is above the marginal cost, there is more entry compared to the known cost case. More-
over, the incumbent’s production decrease with the virtual marginal cost thereby generating
more entry. Depending on the distribution of the incumbent’s marginal cost, the other form of
inefficiency arises, that is, a less efficient competitor enters the market.
There is more competition on the downstream market under asymmetric information than
under symmetric information. This is in sharp contrast with Dana and Spier (1994) and Caillaud
and Tirole (2003), where incomplete information reduces competition. In Dana and Spier (1994),
where the regulator only regulates the market structure, monopoly production is more likely
under asymmetric information. Moreover, the monopoly right is not necessarily granted to the
more efficient firm. The market could be operated alone by the high cost firm when the low
cost firm has a larger virtual marginal cost than the high cost one. This can happen only if the
marginal costs are not distributed according to the same density function. In our framework, this
could happen even if θ and φ are distributed according to the same distribution. But there is no
exclusive right: except for the most efficient incumbent, the regulator never grants a monopoly
franchise and all types of incumbent face a positive probability of entry.
In Caillaud (1990), the incumbent shuts down whenever the virtual marginal cost of the
incumbent is larger than the expected marginal cost of the entrants (z(θ) > E(φ)), provided that
the marginal costs of the incumbent and the competitive fringe are distributed independently.
Hence, the mechanism allows the entry of less efficient competitors, when on an average the
entrants’ technology is more efficient than the incumbent’s one. Being regulated, the cost of the
incumbent’s technology includes an information rent. When the incumbent operates, the price
is maintained at the level of the regulated monopoly regime, but the incumbent produces less.
Given that the regulator cannot deter entry by setting a large fixed access charge (since the
entrants bypass the incumbent’s input), there is more entry compared to our setting.
In a regulated market, open to competition, an efficient market structure is not granted since
market efficiency conflicts with other objectives of the regulator, like infrastructure financing.
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6 Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.3: From condition (4.1) it follows that in stage 2, the
optimal quantity of the entrant is
qe(V ) =
 0 if φ ≥ K(θ)a−φ−α(θ)−bqi(θ)
2b if φ < K(θ)
where the entry limit is K(θ) = P (qi(θ)) − α(θ) − 2
√
bA(θ) and zero quantity refers to the no
entry case. In stage 1, the regulator incorporates this entry decision in her optimization program
(I). Using the incumbent’s profit function Πi(θ) we substitute
P (Q(θ))qi(θ) + t(θ) =
 Πi(θ) + c+ θqi(θ) if no entryΠi(θ) + c+ θqi(θ)− α(θ)qe(V (θ))−A(θ) if entry
in (I). This substitution means that the regulator’s objective function for any type θ ∈ [θ, θ] is
W1(θ) =
1
∆
 φ=K(θ)∫
φ=θ
{S(Q(θ))− (P (Q(θ))− α(θ))qe(V (θ)) +A(θ)} dφ+
φ=θ∫
φ=K(θ)
S(qi(θ))dφ
− θqi(θ)− c− Πˆi(θ)
Simplifying the function W1(θ), by substituting S(Q(θ)) =
∫ qi(θ)
0 P (x)dx+
∫Q(θ)
qi(θ)
P (x)dx and by
substituting Q(θ) = qi(θ) + qe(V (θ)) in the first integrand, we get
W1(θ) = (a− θ)qi(θ)− b{qi(θ)}
2
2
+
A(θ)J(θ)
∆
− 7
√
b{A(θ)} 32
3∆
− α(θ)A(θ)
∆
+
α(θ)J2(θ)
4b∆
+
J3(θ)
24b∆
− c− Πˆi(θ) (6.4)
where J(θ) ≡ P (qi(θ)) − θ − α(θ). Given the objective function (6.4), it is obvious that, since
the regulator wants to ensure the participation constraint of the incumbent and since the cost
of the incumbent is common knowledge, she will select qi(θ), A(θ), α(θ) and t(θ) in such a way
that Πˆi(θ) = 0. Incorporating Πˆi(θ) = 0 in (6.4) we get
W f (θ) = (a− θ)qi(θ)− b{qi(θ)}
2
2
+
A(θ)J(θ)
∆
− 7
√
b{A(θ)} 32
3∆
− α(θ)A(θ)
∆
+
α(θ)J2(θ)
4b∆
+
J3(θ)
24b∆
− c (6.5)
Therefore, the problem of the regulator now reduces to the selection of qi(θ), A(θ) and α(θ) that
maximizes W f (θ). The partial derivatives of W f (θ) with respect to qi(θ), A(θ) and α(θ) are
∂W f (θ)
∂qi(θ)
= P (qi(θ))− θ − A(θ)b∆ −
α(θ)J(θ)
2∆
− J
2(θ)
8∆
(6.6)
∂W f (θ)
∂A(θ)
=
J(θ)
∆
− 7
√
bA(θ)
2∆
− α(θ)
∆
(6.7)
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and
∂W f (θ)
∂α(θ)
= −2A(θ)
∆
+
J2(θ)
8b∆
− α(θ)J(θ)
2b∆
(6.8)
respectively.
From (6.7) we get A(θ) = 449b(J(θ)− α(θ))2 or
49bA(θ)− 4J2(θ) + 8J(θ)α(θ) = 4α2(θ) (6.9)
From (6.8) we get
16bA(θ)− J2(θ) + 4J(θ)α(θ) = 0 (6.10)
From (6.9) and (6.10) we get
15J2(θ) + 68J(θ)α(θ) + 64α2(θ) = 0 (6.11)
Solving (6.11) we get
α(θ) = −3(P (qi(θ))− θ) (6.12)
and
α(θ) = − 5
11
(P (qi(θ))− θ) (6.13)
If (6.12) holds, then from (6.9) we get A(θ) = 449bα
2(θ). By substituting A(θ) = 449bα
2(θ) in
(6.6), we have after simplifications: P (qi(θ)) = θ. Therefore, one possible candidate solution is
V1(θ) = 〈qi(θ) = a−θb , A(θ) = 4b (θ − θ)2, α(θ) = −3(θ − θ)〉. This solution implies a total entry
ban: K(θ) = θ ∀θ. If (6.13) holds, then from (6.9) we get A(θ) = 3625bα2(θ). By substituting
A(θ) = 3625bα
2(θ)in (6.6), we have after simplifications:
P (qi(θ)) = θ +
28
25
α2(θ)
∆
(6.14)
From (6.13) and (6.14), we get
−11
5
α(θ) + θ = θ +
28
25
α2(θ)
∆
(6.15)
Solving for α(θ), we get
α(θ) = − 5
56
(11∆±
√
121∆2 − 112∆(θ − θ) (6.16)
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Since at θ, α(θ) = 0, we get α(θ) = − 556(11∆ −
√
121∆2 − 112∆(θ − θ)). Then from con-
dition (6.13), we get P (qi(θ)) = θ − 115 α(θ). Thus, the other possible candidate solution
is V2(θ) = 〈qi(θ) = a−H(θ)b , α(θ) = − 511(H(θ) − θ), A(θ) = 36(H(θ)−θ)
2
121b 〉 where H(θ) = θ +
121∆−11
√
121∆2−112∆(θ−θ)
56 . From the expression of H(θ), it is easy to check that H(θ) = θ and
H(θ) > θ for all θ ∈ (θ, θ]. Differentiating H(θ) twice with respect to θ we get that H(θ)
is strictly increasing and strictly convex in θ ∈ (θ, θ). With solution V2(θ), there is an entry
possibility. In particular, the entry limit is K(θ) = θ + 411 [121∆ − 11
√
121∆2 − 112∆(θ − θ)].
Here K(θ) ∈ (θ, θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ].
It is straightforward to show that the welfare associated with the solution V2(θ) is larger
than the no entry solution V1(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ]. For any type θ ∈ [θ, θ], the welfare difference
between the entry and no entry case is
W f (θ)|V2(θ) −W f (θ)|V1(θ) =
(H(θ)− θ)(H(θ)− θ)
3b
1− 3
4
1−
√
1− 112(θ − θ)
121∆

 (6.17)
Condition (6.17) is obtained after substituting the values of V2(θ) and V1(θ) in W f (θ)|V2(θ) and
W f (θ)|V1(θ) respectively and then simplifying W
f (θ)|V2(θ) −W f (θ)|V1(θ) by using the condition
(H(θ)−θ)2 = 121∆28 (H(θ)−θ).15 From condition (6.17) it follows that W f (θ)|V2(θ) =W f (θ)|V1(θ)
since H(θ) = θ. More importantly, from condition (6.17) it also follows that W f (θ)|V2(θ) >
W f (θ)|V1(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ] since the right hand side of condition (6.17) is then strictly positive.
Hence, solution V2(θ) gives a higher welfare than the no entry solution V1(θ).
To verify the second order condition under V2(θ), we first incorporate the values of α(θ) =
− 511(P (qi(θ))− θ) and A(θ) = 36(P (qi(θ))−θ)
2
121b as a function of the quantity qi(θ) in W
f (θ). This
gives
W f (θ) = (a− θ)qi(θ)− b{qi(θ)}
2
2
+
28(P (qi(θ))− θ)3
363b∆
− c (6.18)
The second derivative of W f (θ) with respect to qi(θ) gives
∂2W f (θ)
∂qi(θ)2
= −b
√
121∆2 − 112∆(θ − θ)
11∆
(6.19)
Clearly,
∂2W f (θ)|S2
∂qi(θ)2
< 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ). Hence the optimal solution to the regulator’s problem
is V2(θ) = 〈qfi (θ) = a−H(θ)b , Af (θ) = 36(H(θ)−θ)
2
121b , α
f (θ) = − 511(H(θ) − θ)〉 where H(θ) = θ +
121∆−11
√
121∆2−112∆(θ−θ)
56 . The optimal transfer is obtained from the profit expression Πˆ
f
i (θ) = 0.
Recall that Πˆfi (θ) = 0 implies that
1
∆
 φ=K
f (θ)∫
φ=θ
{
P (Qf (θ))qfi (θ) + α
f (θ)qe(V2(θ), φ) +A
f (θ)
}
dφ+
φ=θ∫
φ=Kf (θ)
P (qfi (θ))q
f
i (θ)dφ
−c−θqfi (θ)+tf (θ) = 0
(6.20)
15This condition follows quite easily by simplifying (H(θ)− θ)2.
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Using the optimal solution V2(θ), it is easy to verify that expected market price for any θ ∈ [θ, θ]
is
Pˆ f (θ) ≡
 φ=K
f (θ)∫
φ=θ
P (Qf (θ))dφ+
φ=θ∫
φ=Kf (θ)
P (qfi (θ))dφ
 = θ (6.21)
Condition (6.21) is obtained after simplifying Pˆ f (θ) by using (H(θ)− θ)2 = 121∆28 (H(θ)− θ). By
substituting (6.21) in (6.20) and then simplifying it we get
tf (θ) = c− 1
∆
 φ=K(θ)∫
φ=θ
{α(θ)qe(V (θ)) +A(θ)} dφ
 (6.22)
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Finally, one can easily verify that the expected revenue of the incumbent,
that is, 1∆
[∫ φ=K(θ)
φ=θ {α(θ)qe(V (θ)) +A(θ)} dφ
]
is equal to 4(H(θ)−θ)
3
113b∆
> 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ] which
implies that tf (θ) < c for all θ ∈ (θ, θ].
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.5: The objective of the regulator is to select a quadruple
M = 〈qi(θ), α(θ), A(θ), t(θ)〉 that maximizes the objective function Wˆ ≡
∫ θ=θ
θ=θ W (θ)dθ subject to
the incentive compatibility constraint (Πˆi(θ) ≥ Πˆi(θ; θ′),∀(θ, θ′) ∈ [θ, θ]2) and the participation
constraint (Πˆi(θ) ≥ 0,∀θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Here the social welfare function, when the incumbent’s
type is θ, is given by W (θ) = 1∆
∫ φ=θ
φ=θ {S(Q(θ))− P (Q(θ))Q(θ)− t(θ)} dφ. Following the same
steps as in the proof of Proposition 4.3 (for simplifying W (θ)), one can rewrite the problem
of the regulator as one of maximizing Wˆ ≡ ∫ θ=θθ=θ W1(θ)dθ subject to (i) Πˆi(θ) ≥ Πˆi(θ; θ′),
∀(θ, θ′) ∈ [θ, θ]2 and (ii) Πˆi(θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] where W1(θ) is given by (6.4). From the incentive
constraint and participation constraint we know that Πˆi(θ) =
∫ θ
θ qi(τ)dτ . Incorporating this
restriction on expected profit of the incumbent, we can write the objective function of the
regulator as Wˆ ≡ ∫ θ=θθ=θ W¯1(θ)dθ where
W¯1(θ) = a−θqi(θ)− b{qi(θ)}
2
2
+
A(θ)J(θ)
∆
− 7
√
b{A(θ)} 32
3∆
−α(θ)A(θ)
∆
+
α(θ)J2(θ)
4b∆
+
J3(θ)
24b∆
−c−
∫ θ
θ
qsi (τ)dτ (6.23)
Since integrating
∫ θ=θ
θ=θ
{∫ θ
θ qi(τ)dτ
}
dθ by parts we get
∫ θ=θ
θ=θ
{∫ θ
θ qi(τ)dτ
}
dθ =
∫ θ=θ
θ=θ L(θ)qi(θ)dθ,
we can finally write down the objective function of the regulator as Wˆ ≡ ∫ θ=θθ=θ W s1 (θ)dθ where
W s1 (θ) = a− z(θ)qi(θ)− b{qi(θ)}
2
2
+
A(θ)J(θ)
∆
− 7
√
b{A(θ)} 32
3∆
− α(θ)A(θ)
∆
+
α(θ)J2(θ)
4b∆
+
J3(θ)
24b∆
− c (6.24)
The optimization can now be done pointwise, that is, the regulator’s problem now is to select
qi(θ), A(θ) and α(θ) that maximizesW s1 (θ) (given by (6.24)) for each θ. This problem is similar to
that of the maximization problem in the proof of Proposition (4.3) where the regulator’s problem
was to select qi(θ), A(θ) and α(θ) to maximizeW
f
1 (θ) given by (6.5). The only difference between
W f1 (θ) and W
s
1 (θ) is that while in the former we had a term −θqi(θ), in the latter this term is
replaced by −z(θ)qi(θ). Thus, following similar steps we get the optimal quantity of the incum-
bent and the optimal access charges as qsi (θ) = q
f
i (z(θ)), A
s(θ) = Af (z(θ)) and αs(θ) = αf (z(θ))
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respectively for each θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Thus, the optimal solution is V s(θ) = 〈qsi (θ), As(θ), αs(θ)〉. It
is important to note that like in the known cost case the entry ban solution under asymmetric
information (that is, V (θ) = 〈qi(θ) = a−z(θ)b , A(θ) = 4b (z(θ) − θ)2, α(θ) = −3(z(θ) − θ)〉) is
pointwise sub-optimal since, for each type θ, it yields a welfare not higher than the optimal so-
lution V s(θ). Finally, by substituting the optimal qsi (θ), A
s(θ) and αs(θ) in (4.3) and by setting
Πˆi(θ) =
∫ θ
θ qi(τ)dτ , we get t
s(θ) = tf (z(θ))− L(θ)qsi (θ) +
∫ θ
θ q
s
i (τ)dτ .
If the distribution f(θ) is such that z(θ) ≤ θ+ 9112∆, then H(z(θ)) is defined for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]
and the solution given above is valid. If, however, z(θ) > θ + 9112∆ then we have an existence
problem. This means that H(z(θ)) = θ + 121∆−11
√
121∆2−112∆(z(θ)−θ)
56 is not defined when z(θ)
is above θ + 9112∆. Given that z(θ) is increasing in θ, there is an existence problem for all
θ ∈ [θ˜, θ] where θ˜ = z−1(θ+ 9112∆). The existence problem comes from the non concavity of the
W s1 (θ) function for all θ such that z(θ) > θ+
9
112∆. When we incorporate the optimal values of
αs(θ), As(θ) in W s1 (θ), we get:
W s1 (θ) = (a− z(θ))qi(θ)−
b{qi(θ)}2
2
+
28(P (qi(θ))− θ)3
363b∆
− c (6.25)
The second derivative of W s1 (θ) with respect to q
s
i (θ) gives:
∂2W s1 (θ)
∂qsi (θ)2
= −b
√
121∆2 − 112∆(z(θ)− θ)
11∆
(6.26)
The second derivative in condition (6.26) is negative only if z(θ) < θ + 9112∆ and not defined
otherwise. Hence, if the distribution f(θ) is such that (6.26) is not defined, the above solution
is not valid for all θ ∈ [θ˜, θ].
To solve this non-existence problem with pointwise optimization we incorporate optimum
bunching procedure. For that we need to apply optimal control theory. We break the regulator’s
problem into two sub-problems. We define an interval [θ, θ˜) where we have full separability of
types and the interval [θ˜, θ] where we have pooling of types and θ˜ is an, as yet undetermined,
cut-off point. The incentive compatibility problem in terms of the first derivative (that is,
∂Πˆi(θ)
∂θ = −qi(θ)) acts as the equation of motion in the two sub-problems and the condition
Πˆi(θ) = 0 (obtained from participation constraint) is the transversality condition. We solve for
the two sub-problems and finally select the optimal cut-off point θ˜. This cut-off point turns out
to be a point where we had existence problem with pointwise maximization. Thus, the optimal
solution is identical to the pointwise optimization problem in the well-defined zone and is a
pooling one for higher types. Finally, it is quite easy to verify that this solution weakly dominates
the monopoly solution V (θ) = 〈qi(θ) = a−z(θ)b , A(θ) = 4b (z(θ) − θ)2, α(θ) = −3(z(θ) − θ)〉
pointwise.
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